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Summary
The Department of the Navy (DON) has several efforts underway to transform U.S.
naval forces to prepare them for future military challenges.  The Navy has organized
these efforts under a conceptual framework called Sea Power 21.  Key elements of naval
transformation include a focus on operating in littoral waters, network-centric
operations, use of unmanned vehicles, reducing personnel requirements, directly
launching and supporting expeditionary operations ashore from sea bases, new kinds of
naval formations, new ship-deployment approaches, and streamlined and reformed
business practices.  Naval transformation poses several potential issues for Congress.
This report will be updated as events warrant.
Background
This report focuses on the transformation of U.S. naval forces — the Navy and the
Marine Corps, which are both contained in the Department of the Navy (DON).  For an
overview of defense transformation in general, as well as references to CRS products on
other specific aspects of defense transformation, see CRS Report RL32238, Defense
Transformation: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
What Is Defense Transformation?  Defense transformation can be defined as
large-scale, discontinuous, and possibly disruptive changes in military weapons,
organization, and concepts of operations (i.e., approaches to warfighting) that are
prompted by significant changes in technology or the emergence of new and different
international security challenges.  In contrast to incremental or evolutionary military
change brought about by normal modernization efforts, defense transformation is more
likely to feature discontinuous or disruptive forms of change.  Some military analysts
believe that defense transformation is made possible by new technologies, such as
advanced information technologies (IT) for networked operations, distributed sensors,
unmanned vehicles, and precision-guided munitions.  They also believe that defense
transformation is necessary if U.S. military forces are to be adequately prepared for 21st
century military challenges, particularly so-called asymmetric challenges, in which
adversaries avoid competing head-on against current U.S. military strengths.
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One key asymmetric challenge, analysts believe, is the need to counter so-called anti-
access or area-denial capabilities — capabilities intended to prevent U.S. forces from
gaining access to the ports, airfields, bases, staging areas, and littoral (near-shore) sea
areas that the United States now depends on to mount military operations in distant
military theaters.  Systems for countering U.S. naval forces in littoral areas could include
submarines, mines, anti-ship cruise missiles, and air-defense systems.  Another key
asymmetric challenge, analysts believe, is the need to counter terrorism and weapons of
mass destruction.
Navy Sea Power 21 Framework.  DON has organized its transformation efforts
under its overall vision for the future, called Sea Power 21, which is built around three
main components:
! Sea Strike, which refers to the ability of naval forces to project precise
and persistent offensive power from the sea;
! Sea Shield, which refers to the ability of naval forces to not only defend
themselves at sea, but to contribute to homeland defense, project an
overland defensive shield to help protect overseas U.S. allies and friends,
and provide a sea-based theater and strategic defense against ballistic
missiles; and
! Sea Basing, which refers to the ability of naval forces to operate at sea,
as sovereign entities, free from concerns of access and political
constraints associated with using land bases in other countries.
These three components are to be supported and bound together by ForceNet, the
Navy’s overarching concept for combining the various computer networks that U.S. naval
forces are now fielding into a master computer network for tying together U.S. naval
personnel, ships, aircraft, and installations.  An additional part of Sea Power 21 is a
Global Concept of Operations under which various types of naval formations are to be
used for forward presence, crisis response, and warfighting operations.1
DON Transformation Centers, Exercises, and Experiments.  Many DON
transformation activities efforts take place at the Navy Warfare Development Command
(NWDC), which is located at the Naval War College at Newport, RI, and the Marine
Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL), which is located at the Marine Corps Base at
Quantico, VA.2  These two organizations generate ideas for naval transformation and act
as clearinghouses and evaluators of transformation ideas generated in other parts of DON.
NWDC and MCWL oversee major exercises, known as Fleet Battle Experiments (FBEs)
and Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWEs), that are intended to explore new naval
concepts of operation.  The Navy and Marine Corps also participate with the Army and
Air Force in joint exercises aimed at testing transformation ideas.
Key Features of Naval Transformation.  Table 1 below summarizes several
key features of U.S. naval transformation.
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Table 1.  Key Features of U.S. Naval Transformation
Previous U.S. Naval forces Transformed U.S. Naval forces
Plan for stand-alone, mid-ocean operations
against Soviet naval forces
Plan for joint and combined operations in littoral
waters against regional adversaries
Primary focus on major combat operations Increased focus on global war on terrorism (GWOT)
Platform-centric operations Network-centric operations
Manned platforms only Significant use of unmanned vehicles
Intermediate land bases established to support
expeditionary operations ashore
Sea basing concept for staging forces at sea and
conducting expeditionary operations ashore with
little or no reliance on nearby land bases
Primary formations are carrier battle groups and
amphibious ready groups
Use of new naval formations, such as expeditionary
strike groups
Traditional ship-deployment approaches New approaches, such as the Fleet Response Plan
(FRP) and Sea Swap
Manpower-intensive ships and shore operations;
people treated as a “free good”
Ships and shore operations with fewer people; cost
of personnel fully recognized
Traditional business practices Streamlined, reformed practices
Littoral Operations.  In late 1992, with the publication of a Navy document
entitled ...From the Sea, the Navy formally shifted the focus of its planning away from the
Cold War scenario of countering Soviet naval forces in mid-ocean waters and toward the
post-Cold War scenario of operating in littoral (near-shore) waters to counter the land-
and sea-based forces of potential regional aggressors.  This shift in planning focus has led
to numerous changes for the Navy in concepts of operation, training, and equipment over
the last 12 years.  Among other things, it moved the focus of Navy planning from a
geographic environment where it could expect to operate primarily by itself to one where
it would need to be able to operate effectively in a joint manner, alongside other U.S.
forces, and in a combined manner, alongside military forces of other countries.  It also led
to an increased emphasis on amphibious warfare, mine warfare, and defense against
diesel-electric submarines and small surface craft.  The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
program is a key current Navy effort intended to improve the Navy’s ability to operate in
heavily defended littoral waters.3
Global War On Terrorism (GWOT).  The Navy in mid-2005 began
implementing several initiatives intended to increase its ability to participate in the global
war on terrorism (GWOT), including the establishment of the following: a Navy
Expeditionary Combat Command (ECC); a riverine force; a reserve civil affairs battalion;
a maritime intercept operations (MIO) intelligence exploitation pilot program; an
intelligence data-mining capability at the National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC);
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and a Navy Foreign Area Officer (FAO) community consisting of officers with
specialized knowledge of foreign countries and regions.4
Network-Centric Operations.  The concept of network-centric operations, also
called network-centric warfare (NCW), is a key feature of transformation for all U.S.
military services.  The concept, which emerged in the late 1990s, involves using computer
networking technology to tie together personnel, ships, aircraft, and installations in a
series of local and wide-area networks capable of rapidly transmitting critical information.
Many in DON believe that NCW will lead to changes in naval concepts of operation and
significantly increase U.S. naval capabilities and operational efficiency.  Key NCW
efforts include the Navy’s Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) network, the Naval
Fires Network (NFN), the IT-21 investment strategy, and the above-mentioned ForceNet
concept.  A related program is the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI).5
Unmanned Vehicles.  Many analysts believe that unmanned vehicles (UVs) will
be another central feature of U.S. military transformation.  Perhaps uniquely among the
military departments, DON in coming years will likely acquire UVs of every major kind
 — air, surface, underwater, and ground.  Widespread use of UVs could lead to significant
changes in the numbers and types of crewed ships and piloted aircraft that the Navy
procures in the future, in naval concepts of operation, and in measurements of naval
power.  The LCS is to deploy various kinds of UVs as a principal means of defeating
enemy anti-access/area-denial systems in heavily defended littoral waters.  Unmanned air
vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned combat air vehicles, or UCAVs (which are armed
UAVs), if implemented widely, could change the shape naval aviation.  Unmanned
underwater vehicles (UUVs) and UAVs could significantly expand the capabilities of
Navy submarines.6
Sea Basing For Expeditionary Operations.  Separate from its use as the name
of one of the three main components of the Sea Power 21 conceptual framework, DON
is using the term sea basing in a second and somewhat more specific way, to refer to a
new operational concept under which force would be staged at sea and expeditionary
operations ashore would be conducted with little or no reliance on a nearby base ashore.
Under the sea basing concept, functions previously conducted from the nearby land base,
including command and control, fire support, and logistics support, would be relocated
to the sea base, which is to be formed by a combination of amphibious and sealift-type
ships.  The sea basing concept responds to a central concern of transformation advocates
— that fixed overseas land bases in the future will become increasingly vulnerable to
enemy anti-access/area-denial weapons such as cruise missiles and theater-range ballistic
missiles.  Although the sea basing concept originated with the Navy and Marine Corps,
the concept can be applied to joint operations involving the Army and Air Force.
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To implement the sea basing concept, the Navy wants to procure a 14-ship squadron,
called the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), or MPF(F) squadron, that would
include three new-construction large-deck amphibious ships, nine new-construction
sealift-type ships, and two existing sealift-type ships.  Additional “connector” ships would
be used to move equipment to the MPF(F) ships, and from the MPF(F) ships to the
operational area ashore.  Some analysts have questioned the potential affordability and
cost effectiveness of the sea basing concept.7
New Kinds of Naval Formations.  The Navy in the past has relied on carrier
battle groups (CVBGs) and amphibious ready groups (ARGs) as its standard ship
formations.  As mentioned earlier, as part of its new Global Concept of Operations, the
Navy plans to begin using new kinds of naval formations — such as expeditionary strike
groups, or ESGs (i.e., amphibious ships combined with surface combatants, attack
submarines, and land-based P-3 maritime patrol aircraft), surface strike groups (SSGs),
and modified Trident SSGN submarines carrying cruise missiles and special operations
forces8 — for forward presence, crisis response, and warfighting operations.  A key Navy
objective in moving to these new formation is to significantly increase the number of
independently deployable, strike-capable naval formations.  ESGs, for example, are
considered to be formations of this kind, while ARGs generally were not.
New Ship-Deployment Approaches.  The Navy is implementing or
experimenting with new ship-deployment approaches that are intended to improve the
Navy’s ability to respond to emergencies and increase the amount of time that ships spend
on station in forward deployment areas.  Key efforts in this area include the Fleet
Response Plan (FRP) for emergency surge deployments and the Sea Swap concept for
long-duration forward deployments with crew rotation.  The FRP, Navy officials say,
permits the Navy to deploy up to 6 of its 11 planned CSGs within 30 days, and an
additional CSG within another 60 days after that (which is called “6+1”).  Navy officials
believe Sea Swap can reduce the stationkeeping multiplier — the number of ships of a
given kind needed to maintain one ship of that kind on continuously station in an overseas
operating area — by 20% or more.9
Reduced Personnel Requirements.  The Navy is implementing a variety of
steps to substantially reduce the number of uniformed Navy personnel required to carry
out functions both at sea and ashore.  DON officials state that these actions are aimed at
moving the Navy away from an outdated “conscript mentality,” under which Navy
personnel were treated as a free good, and toward a more up-to-date approach under
which the high and rising costs of personnel are fully recognized.  Under the DOD’s
proposed FY2007 budget and FY2007-FY2011 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP),
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active Navy end strength is to decline from 362,941 in FY2005 to 352,700 in FY2006 and
340,700 by FY2007.  Reductions in personnel requirements ashore are to be accomplished
through organizational streamlining and reforms, and the transfer of jobs from uniformed
personnel to civilian DON employees.  Reductions in personnel requirements at sea are
to be accomplished by introducing new-design ships that can be operated with
substantially smaller crews — a shift that could lead to significant changes in Navy
practices for recruiting, training, and otherwise managing its personnel.  Current ship-
acquisition programs related to this goal include the LCS, the DDG-1000 (formerly
DD(X)) destroyer,10 and the CVN-21 aircraft carrier.11
Improved Business Practices.  DON is pursuing a variety of initiatives to
improve its processes and business practices so as to generate savings that can be used to
help finance Navy transformation.  Under the Sea Power 21 framework, these efforts are
referred to collectively as Sea Enterprise.
Issues for Congress
Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
! Are current DON transformation efforts inadequate, excessive, or about
right?  Is DON’s roadmap for guiding the implementation of its
transformation plans adequate?  Are DON transformation efforts
adequately coordinated with those of the Army and Air Force?
! Is DON placing too much or too little emphasis on certain components
of transformation?  Is DON, for example, striking the proper balance
between transformation initiatives for participating in the global war on
terrorism (GWOT) and those for preparing for a potential challenge from
improved Chinese maritime military forces?12
! Is DON achieving a proper balance between transformation and
potentially competing program goals, such as maintaining near-term
readiness and near-term equipment procurement?
! How might naval transformation affect Navy force-structure
requirements?13
